I. INTRODUCTION
Concern has been expressed for safety of the general public and for research personnel during research on recombinant DNA hybrid microorganisms (Wade, 1975) . There appear to be assumptions that, first, a recombinant can, and may, be developed that will equal or exceed the virulence, infectivity and contagiousness of any presently known microorganism, and, second, that this agent will be transmitted to the general public either by infected laboratory personnel or by microorganisms leaving the laboratory on clothing, or in refuse, dead animals, sewage, or air.
There is no doubt that the hypothetical hybrid can be hazardous for all persons entering the laboratory, as is clearly evident from the many reports and analyses on laboratory-acquired infections. The value of containment facilities for laboratoryassociated persons will be discussed in Section III.
The second assumption has almost no supporting epidemiological experience. Review of the literature yielded 35 accounts of laboratory microepidemics (Table 1) . These can be examined for their effect upon the general public. Almost all of these epidemics occurred in the absence of safety equipment and of adequate efforts to control contaminated air, sewage, refuse, and laundry. Usually no more than rubber gloves and surgical masks were used during work on an open bench top. This is not unique. The history of microbiological research is characterized by a primary emphasis upon protecting the experiment rather than upon protecting the experimenter. Most work with human disease-producing microorganisms has been and is done on open bench tops with few or no precautions in the handling of air, sewage, refuse, laundry, or access to the laboratory. The ventilated safety cabinet, which is the principal safety device to protect the laboratory worker from exposures to infectious agents, was not commercially available until 1950. It also is significant that the National Institutes of Health did not have a research laboratory specifically designed to provide safe conditions for research with infectious agents until 1947 (USPHS, 1947) .
Nevertheless, it has not been possible to find reports of laboratory-attributed infection in persons who never were in the laboratory building or who were not associated in some way with the laboratory. Reports of infection by association include (1) Q fever from unsterilized laboratory clothing in six employees in a (Oliphant, 1949) , (2) two persons involved in laundry, cleaning, and contact with a technician in a rooming house during a laboratory outbreak of Q fever (Oliphant, 1949) , (3) Q fever in a switchboard operator in a nearby buildingextent of contact with laboratory personnel is unknown (Oliphant, 1948) , (4) Q fever in a wife whose husband was believed not to have taken the required shower before going home (Wedum, 1965) , (5) facial anthrax lesion in the wife of a bacteriologist during a time (January 1946) when there were several laboratory cutaneous infections (Wedum, 1965; Ellingson, 1946) , and (6) nine hospitalized and 26 non-hospitalized cases of Q fever in employees of a rendering plant that processed Q fever-infected guinea pig carcasses from a laboratory (Feldman, 1950) . No other laboratory-associated cases were found, although there are a few instances of a wife becoming infected after her husband contracted an occupational illness, and several infections of visitors.
The preponderance of Q fever reflects the unusual stability of the etiologic agent and the small amount required to infect man (1 to 10 microorganisms), although the same low human infective dosage also applies to the etiologic agents of tularemia, typhus, Venezuelan encephalitis, and others (Wedum, 1972) .
The absence of proved laboratory-initiated public hazard also is reflected in the Godber Report (Dept. HSS, 1975) , which, from among all the agents listed in Table 1 , places only Marburg virus in Category A, "Pathogens presenting hazards primarily or significantly to the human community."
The one exception to the above discussion is the recent instance in England of fatal smallpox transmitted to two visitors by a hospitalized vaccinated laboratory technician mildly ill with smallpox undiagnosed at the time of the visit (Editorial, 1973) . The Godber Report was a consequence of the two deaths. However, the infection of the two visitors is primarily an affair of medical practice and hospital epidemiology. For the purpose of evaluating the efficacy of P4 containment, the value of this unique episode is its indication that the only publically hazardous recombinants will be those that carry the genes that insure person-to-person transmission typically demonstrated by such diseases as smallpox, chicken pox, and measles. Without that gene (if there is such), the recombinant disease will be controlled by the usual hygienic and public health practices of our civilization. Furthermore, if person-to-person transmission is going to happen, early warning will be given by the appearance of carriers or illnesses in the laboratory population. This warning would not occur if all laboratory-associated personnel were effectively vaccinated against the contagious recombinant, which is a most unlikely situation. Examination of the report by Pike (Pike, 1975) on 3,921 laboratory infections shows that at least 95% were noncontagious diseases, and, if one excludes tuberculosis, less than 5% consisted of diphtheria, Neisserian meningitis, plague, syphilis, and viral respiratory (e.g., influenza), enteric (e.g., coxsackie), or exanthematous (e.g., vacciniasmallpox) diseases. The assembled reports conspicuously fail to include any accounts of transmission to the general public except as mentioned above. The 3,921 infections include 389 "overt" Detrick cases, according to a letter from the late Dr. S. E. Sulkin, dated 4 September 1969.
II. DEFINITIONS
In discussions about precautionary facilities desirable to minimize human risk accompanying research with recombinant DNA hybrid microorganisms, it is not uncommon to hear the Fort Detrick experience quoted as proof that infection of laboratory personnel cannot be prevented. It is true that good engineering design is not a completely adequate substitute for thoughtfully applied good technique, but the reverse also is true. Both are necessary.
A typical public statement is as follows: "Even in the P4 conditions of the Army's biological warfare laboratories at Fort Detrick, there were 423 cases of infection and three deaths over some 25 years" (Wade, 1975) .
Detailed analysis of the conditions under which those 423 infections were acquired does not support the statement, because P4 conditions, insofar as this requires biological safety cabinets or a gastight cabinet system with attached gloves, never was present in all the laboratories during the 25 years' experience. P4 and P3 conditions are defined as follows (USPHS, 1975) : "P4 level (high). Work areas are in a special facility of the type designed to contain highly infectious and hazardous microbiological agents. These areas are isolated by airlocks, a negative pressure environment, personnel clothing change and shower rooms, and treatment systems to inactivate or remove biohazardous agents contaminating exhaust air, liquid and solid wastes. All persons occupying these areas should wear protective laboratory clothing and shower at each exit from the facility. The handling of the biohazardous agents should be confined to biological safety cabinets in which the exhaust air is incinerated or passed through HEPA filters." "P3 level (moderate). In addition to the P2 procedures, this level requires the following: (i) Operations with potentially hazardous organisms that require P3 containment should be carried out in a laboratory that is separated from areas where less than P3 containment is practiced. The ventilation system shall be balanced to provide for an inflow of supply air from the adjacent corridor into the laboratory through the access doorway. This supply airflow shall be in excess of 50 cubic feet per minute. The general exhaust air from these laboratories should be discharged outdoors and dispersed to the atmosphere to prevent reentry into the building. If recirculated, the air must be decontaminated. Appropriate biohazard signs should be posted at access points to the laboratory, and only persons specifically authorized by the principal investigator should enter when these signs are posted. Normally, authorized persons should be limited to those who work in the laboratory. (ii) Properly installed biological safety cabinets, meeting appropriate NIH performance standards, should be used for all transfer operations and for all procedures likely to produce aerosols. Operations that produce large amounts of aerosols, such as blending, sonication, vortex mixing, and vigorous agitation, should be avoided where possible. Where necessary, they must be carried out in enclosed systems that are not opened until adequate time has been allowed for aerosols to settle. (iii) Gloves should be worn during the handling ofbiohazardous materials. (iv) Vacuum lines should be protected by filters.
P3 level research can be conducted in laboratories where the room airflow and general exhaust air conditions described above cannot be achieved, provided that this work is contained in closed systems which are maintained under a negative pressure of at least 0.25 -inches water gauge. Operations including centrifugation, fractionation, sonication, etc., which involve the handling of recombinant DNA molecules shall be contained in these systems. All materials, before removal from these systems, shall be sterilized or transferred to a sealed unbreakable container which is then removed from the system through a chemical decontamination tank, or after the entire system has been decontaminated."
P3 "properly installed biological safety cabinets, meeting appropriate NIH performance standards," for the purposes of the comparative evaluations in this report, are approximately equal to cabinets referred to in the literature, safety manuals, and manufacturers' advertising, as (l) Class I cabinet (inward airflow of 60 to 100 linear feet per minute through a variable or fixed (8 to 10 inch) cabinet-wide opening for the hands; (2) Class II cabinet (partially recirculated sterile air in a downflow cabinet with an inward airflow and fixed or variable opening as in the Class I); (3) Biosafety cabinet; (4) Biological safety cabinet; (5) Microbiological safety cabinet; (6) Biohazard safety cabinet; (7) Open face safety cabinet; or (8) Biogard hood. In all these, the exhaust air passes through a microbiological filter.
Negative pressure environment. This is a design in which the air flows from outside the building, into the "clean" area, if any, into the laboratory corridors, and into the laboratory rooms, from which the air is exhausted. In some special situations, there also is an exhaust in airlocks, but usually not.
At this point, because of the definition of P3 and P4, it seems pertinent to comment on the value of secondary barriers. Secondary barriers become especially important to personnel within the building when such agents as Coxiella burneti, experimental aerosols, or micronized dry powders are handled, or when there are centrifuging, griding, or similar aerosol-producing procedures without containment precautions, accidents with lyophilized tubes, animals excreting large amounts of infectious bacteria or virus, or pilot plant operations.
In some laboratories, the secondary barriers contribute significantly to integrity of the experiment by reducing nonspecific or cross-infection of materials or animals.
As far as biohazard outside the building is concerned, most secondary barriers are more for reasons of public relations than for anything else, except for pilot plants or other large-volume production, experimental aerosols, use of tick or insect vectors, and agents capable of spread to the animal or plant food supply. This view assumes that known infectious liquids, solids, animals, and animal wastes are decontaminated before disposal, as has long been standard practice in all microbiological laboratories.
It is difficult to determine the importance of negative air balance within a building. In addition to those microepidemics in Table 1 in which the presence of a negatively balanced air-handling system might have reduced the number of infections, there are at least two episodes in which a defective air balance was the determining factor: (1) transmission of hog cholera in the large animal isolation facility of the National Animal Disease Laboratory at Ames, Iowa (Sullivan, 1966) , (2) an -unpublished account ofa case of psittacosis in Building 539 at Fort Detrick in 1961, in an unvaccinated new technician who had never worked with this agent but who worked in the fourth laboratory room down the corridor from a room in which a Henderson aerosol exposure apparatus (Roessler, 1962) was employed for the headonly aerosol challenge of mice and guinea pigs. The day of probable exposures was suitable to explain the day of onset of illness. It must be admitted that maintaining an uninterrupted flow of air from the corridor to all laboratory rooms is virtually impossible, because the door to each laboratory room sometimes is left open and sometimes is kept closed, and because the airflow into ventilated cabinets may be intermittent. The latter condition has caused some installations to operate the blowers of ventilated cabinets continuously as part of the building ventilation system. Of course, the air balance then requires adjustment whenever a ventilated cabinet is added or removed.
III. THE DETRICK EXPERIENCE
Fort Detrick was activated on 10 April 1943, and an operational safety officer for the pilot plant was appointed within the first month. By September 1943 a strong safety organization was organized and staffed principally by physicians and bacteriologists, most of whom were in military service. Formal written safety regulations were issued and well received by the laboratory personnel. However, the protective cabinets characteristic ofP3 and P4 containment systems were absent. The years 1944 through 1969 can be divided into three time periods, based upon the gradually increasing use of Class I ventilated cabinets and gastight Class III systems, and the development of effective vaccines for anthrax, tularemia, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. No infections were reported in 1943.
1944-50 inclusive, with 147 infections
Facilities. During this time, there were no major primary barriers such as ventilated cabinets and ventilated closed cages to supplement the usual laboratory benches, except in one building, which was devoted to the study of microbial aerosols and the aerosol challenge of animals. This Building 524 and its activities have been described in detail by Rosebury (Roseberry, 1947) . The building had no protective ventilated cabinets, but the more hazardous operations preparatory to aerosol challenge were done in a Reyniers germ-free chamber with arm length attached gloves. Animals were kept in ventilated closed cages with exhaust air passed to an oil-fired incinerator. Secondary barriers were present in a developmental stage in Building 524 and in most of the other laboratory buildings (restricted access; air locks; exit autoclaves; refuse incineration; exhaust air treatment that provided a negative air balance in the building; clothing change; exit showers).
Infections, 1944-50 inclusive. There was a marked difference between the number of infections in Building 524 in which hazardous experiments were done with various infectious microbial aerosols inside containment equipment, and the number of infections in other buildings of reasonably comparable size in which basic research confined to a single microbial species was done on open bench tops. No experimental aerosols were generated in these other buildings. In 1950, the first experimental ventilated protective Class I cabinet was tested and the first commercial stainless steel models were delivered by S. Blickman Company. The first cabinets were placed in buildings in which only brucella was under study, because of the severity of the disease and the absence of effective antibiotic treatment. The "tularemia buildings" were the last to receive protective cabinets, because use of a killed vaccine modified the severity of the disease and antibiotic treatment was effective. By 1954, there were 11 buildings containing at least 87 of the new stainless steel ventilated cabinets, mostly of the size 60 inches wide; none were of the 36 inch size. Another 7 buildings had 13 of these safety cabinets.
It is difficult to select examples of P3 and P4 containment during 1951 through 1959, because this was a period of transition from old to new buildings and realignment of research. Also, certain buildings must be excluded because their activities were remote from anything likely to be done in recombinant DNA research. The excluded buildings were those in which experimental aerosols were studied as such or by animal challenge, in large tanks or in the 1,000,000 liter armor-plated sphere, and the pilot plants and associated laboratories engaged in large-scale production of microorganisms or toxin.
Building 376, with Class I and Class III Cabinets. Nevertheless, Building 376, specializing in study of lesser-volume aerosols from liquid or micronized microbial dry powder, and aerosol challenge of animals from mice to monkeys, is a demonstration that a combination of Class I cabinets and Class III gastight cabinets, together with all the usual secondary barriers, can reduce the number of, but cannot prevent, laboratory infections when highly infective organisms are handled as aerosols. This modem brick building, with 38,600 square feet of space, was completed in May, 1953 . It contained 14 ventilated Class I steel cabinets 60 inches wide, and 5 steel 72-inch wide animal-transfer cabinets to use in conjunction with ventilated steel animal cages. There were more than 200 linear feet of Class III gastight cabinets, a pneumatic tube system to convey small animals from aerosol exposure chambers, of the Reyniers type, to the animal caging rooms, and a complex optical system to bring in sunlight to study the effect of its various wave lengths upon microbial aerosols. The effectiveness of containment systems in Building 376 can be better appreciated with knowledge of the numbers of animals challenged with microbial aerosols, the etiologic agents under experimentation, and a realization of the amount of laboratory work preceding and following the aerosolizations. For instance, in 1959 there was aerosol challenge of 46,412 mice, 3,013 guinea pigs, 25 rabbits, 276 monkeys, and 2 chimpanzees. Work included the etiologic agents of anthrax, coccidioidomycosis, plague, psittacosis, Q fever, Rocky Mountain spotted fever, tularemia, Venezuelan encephalitis, yellow fever, and two others.
1960 -1969, inclusive, with 52 infections
These 10 years featured the introduction of an effective live tularemia vaccine in June 1959, with the result that there was only one hospitalized case, in 1961 in a man who had not received the living vaccine, although he had a long history of 17 injections of killed vaccine. There were 10 mild nonhospitalized tularemic infections; 9 had had the live vaccine and 1 with a cutaneous lesion had had pulmonic tularemia in 1957. There was 1 hospitalized VEE case in 1961. But after vaccination with live VEE vaccine began in 1963 there were only 3 mild cases. These three had had the live vaccine.
There were a few cases of other laboratory infections, but the only single agent causing a significant number was Coxiella burneti (Q fever); there were 22 cases, of which only 7 were ill enough to require hospitalization. The 22 infections were scattered among 8 buildings, not including 3 infections of uncertain origin among craftsmen and engineers.
From the viewpoint of evaluating effectiveness of Class I cabinets, the record of Building 560 is noteworthy. This building housed medical microbiological units responsible for basic research on (1) tularemia, (2) plague, (3) genetics, (4) bacterial nutrition, (5) microphysiology, and (6) staphylococcal toxin.
There were over 100 persons daily at risk in the six units, but most of the microbial agents were not highly infectious. Tularemia infections were absent because of protective vaccination. P. pestis is a fragile organism requiring a considerable respiratory dose, as is evident from Pike's report (Pike, 1975) of only 4 laboratory cases in the United States and 6 worldwide. The Genetics Branch worked only with nonpathogens, although there was one hospitalized case of Salmonellosis, ascribed to mouth pipetting. The Bacterial Nutrition and Microphysiology Branches examined a variety of bacteria using Class I cabinets. During the 10 years there was only one infection, in 1963 -severe pulmonary coccidioidomycosis with a cavity in the lung. This was the consequence of using a shaker with a dry spore sediment and glass beads, inside a Class I cabinet with an inserted four porthole panel without attached arm length gloves. The staph enterotoxin unit had 4 illnesses, ascribable to a procedure most unlikely to be duplicated in any studies with recombinant DNA. This procedure involved exposing the heads of monkeys to an aerosol of solubilized aerosolized staph enterotoxin, using a Henderson apparatus in a modified Class I cabinet (Roessler, 1962) . No respiratory protection was worn during transportation of the monkeys (the fur on their heads obviously was shedding enterotoxin) to the animal room, where they were held in open cages.
Nevertheless, a summary made in June 1966 concerning the biohazards in the study of staph enterotoxin does show that Class I hoods were protective. Portions of the summary are reproduced below, from a contractor's report: "Toxic reactions ofpersonnel engaged in purification studies ofthe enterotoxin on an open laboratory bench have included mild cold symptoms, conjunctivitis, and dermatitis. The latter has been severe when concentrated material was contacted by the skin. A tolerance is developed after repeated exposure; however, skin reactions to the concentrated material continue." "Of 15 persons engaged in laboratory purification studies of enterotoxin, one had conjunctivitis, one had a nondescript chemical irritation of the right eye, one had general skin reactions, one had a severe facial skin reaction, one had dermatitis, one had dermatitis and cold symptoms, one has observed no effects, and five were not reported on. No enteric reactions have been noted. "Workers using laboratory hoods did not experience these reactions."
. "One case was reported as having resulted from accidental ingestion of material during a filter cleaning process. The operator wore all prescribed safety equipment including mask, gloves, etc. Accidental ingestion was considered to have occurred during a smoking period, which involved either violation of regulations or insufficient preparatory decontamination.
"Conclusion: Oral pipetting, eating, smoking must be prohibited." "Twenty-three cases were reported during an operation in large, open areas where personnel wore surgical masks or face shields. Most of the cases involved conjunctivitis and acute pharyngitis, and two cases of diarrhea and vomiting occurred. It appeared that even the seemingly innocuous gesture of brushing some exposed body part against clothing worn during processing was sufficient to initiate sensitivity reactions.
"Conclusion: Face shields and conventional surgical masks are not adequate."
Special Examples of Containment
P3. The best example at Fort Detrick, to demonstrate the probable effectiveness of a P3 system in recombinant DNA research that involves a highly infectious agent, lies in the experience of the principal microbiological unit charged with basic research on tularemia, in Building 525. These personnel were moved in 1957 into one wing of a modem brick building, Number 560, completed in 1956 and equipped with all secondary barriers and with 12 Class I ventilated safety cabinets, then known as "Blickmans". About 65 linear feet of a gastight Class III cabinet system were installed several years later, but never used. 1944 -1953 Bldg. 525 1954 -1956 Bldg. 525 1957 -1959 Bldg. 560 1960 -1969 P4. Demonstration of the effectiveness of a P4 system in which no Class I or Class II cabinets were used, and in which all work was done within gastight cabinets, can be seen from the record of an organization housed in Building 459 and later in Building 1412 (72,000 sq. ft.). All the usual secondary barriers were present.
Phases
1. Building 459, a concrete block, one-floor unit of 10,160 sq. ft., was completed in May 1945 and used for storage. In 1951, it was furnished with gastight cabinets only, and assigned work of major hazard with the most infectious and toxic agents. This was basic and applied research using a variety of techniques, procedures, equipment, and small animals, with some incidental aerosol challenge of animals. At that time, it was the only organization with such equipment. The record is as follows: 1952: 1953: 1954: 1955: 1957: 1958: 1959: 1959-1969: One cutaneous chronic brucellosis One nonhospitalized subclinical coccidioidomycosis, and one glanders One nonhospitalized subclinical coccidioidomycosis One tularemia One hospitalized coccidioidomycosis One tularemia This organization moved into a newall-Class III Building 1412. One nonhospitalized cutaneous blastomycosis in 1966 2. Another separately administered research unit occupied that portion of Building 1412 designed for animal aerosol exposure in two stainless steel Freon-tight chambers of 18,000 cubic feet and 30,000 cubic feet, and in two smaller tanks each of 1,500 cubic feet volume. From December 1959 to December 1969, the 55 employees, of whom 45 were daily at risk, carried a weekly work load that commonly included the intracerebral inoculation of 6,000 to 8,000 mice, and the whole-body exposure to microbial aerosols of 200 to 300 guinea pigs and 20 to 30 monkeys with all the associated preliminary and subsequent procedures. Work was with such agents as those causing tularemia, plague, brucellosis, anthrax, Venezuelan encephalitis, coccidioidomycosis, botulism, and Q fever. There was only one infection (cutaneous, nonhospitalized) during the ten years. DISCUSSION 1. In considering the 423 infections at Fort Detrick, in comparison to those reported elsewhere, it should be recognized that the occupational health program was unusually thorough in its active search for occupationally-acquired infections. The maintenance oflarge biological safety and medical departments also was characteristic of the Army biological operations at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. Two unusual formally announced policies contributed to maximizing detection of occupational infection. The first was a policy that "every illness suffered by an occupationally exposed employee will be considered occupational until the medical service of Fort Detrick determines otherwise." The second was that "employees hospitalized by Fort Detrick physicians for illness suspected or known to have been caused by a BW agent under study will be carried on a 'duty' status without charge to annual leave or to sick leave." (This was justified by considering the patient as being a contributor to medical knowledge of a potential BW agent.) Of course, all such medical care was free of charge to the employee.
2. There is some difficulty in comparing the efficacy of the Detrick primary and secondary barriers with the probable efficacy of the proposed P3 and P4 barriers because the definitions of P3 and P4 quoted herein are preliminary and subject to revision. At present, neither P3 nor P4 requires use of "Class III" gastight cabinet systems, although the wording of P4 does not exclude Class III.
3. For the purposes of the following Conclusions, the Class I ventilated safety cabinet used at Fort Detrick is considered to be equivalent to the ventilated safety cabinets specified in P3 and P4 conditions. IV. CONCLUSIONS 1. Class III gastight microbiological cabinet systems, which are neither required nor excluded by the definition of P4, can be operated without infection of the operators, in the very hazardous whole-body and head-only aerosol exposure of small animals and monkeys to USPHS Communicable Disease Center Class 3 and 4 etiologic agents, under standardized somewhat regularly repetitive procedures, with stable, well-trained, well-disciplined personnel (Detrick Bldg. 1412 , Aerobiology Unit, December 1959 -December 1969 .
2. When gastight cabinet systems are used for basic and applied research with Class 3 and 4 agents, in a changing variety of techniques, procedures, equipment, and experiments, there will be some laboratory infections, usually due to breaks in the attached rubber gloves, human exposure during entrance and exit of materials, leaks in the system, and human error. (Bldgs. 459-1412 (Bldgs. 459- , during 1952 (Bldgs. 459- through 1969 : Less than one infection every two years) 3. When a gastight cabinet system and Class I cabinets are both used in aerosol studies with Class 3 and 4 agents, there will be an increased number of infections, in comparison to use of only a Class III system. (Bldg. 376 -18 infections during 1953 through 1958, and only 2 thereafter, mostly due to the introduction of live tularemia vaccine in 1959 and live VEE vaccine in 1963, which ended infection with those two agents. In the entire period 1953 through 1969, there were 20 cases in 17 years, which is a good record.) 4. A research program consisting principally of standardized repetitive procedures is less hazardous than a program that requires comparatively frequent changes in technique and equipment.
5. In the absence of effective vaccination, it is not possible to do basic research with a highly infective agent on the open bench top, nor with Class I cabinets that are accompanied by all the secondary barriers specified in P4, without laboratory infections. (Record during 1944 (Record during -1950 and the record with tularemia in Buildings 525-560 during 1944 Buildings 525-560 during -1969 6. If neither P3 nor P4 requires use of Class III gastight cabinet systems, it will not be possible to prevent laboratory infections if an agent is used that is as infective as Pasteurella tularensis or Coxiella burneti. A definition ofP4 that consists of adding secondary barriers (air locks, negative pressure environment, showers and change rooms) to P3 conditions will not result in a significant decrease in the number of clinical or subclinical laboratory-acquired infections. The addition will reduce the chance of infection of unauthorized visitors, personnel in rooms close to the recombinant DNA research unit, and a wife at home. 7. For research on recombinant DNA, the most effective safety measure to prevent infection of laboratory personnel is to utilize a microorganism that will not infect humans. Otherwise, the greater the required human infective dose, the safer it is.
8. Microorganisms for which there is an effective vaccine, and also in some cases specific effective therapy, could be considered for use in research on recombinant DNA.
